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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of Propulsion Systems Division and the
manufacturing process the internship is intended to address, as well as the problem statement,
approach and an outline for the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Overview
Propulsion Systems is a division within the Boeing Company responsible for all hardware
below an airplane's wing such as the engine, struts and auxiliary power units. A significant
portion of the group's responsibility includes engine buildup (EBU) in support of the 737, 747,
767 and 777 airplane programs. The division has been in operation since 1981 and primarily
operates from two sites - Renton and Everett, Washington. Renton performs EBU for the 737
and the Everett facility performs EBU for the 747, 767 and 777. Since inception the group has
performed over 17,000 EBUs.
The Everett Value Stream - a value stream is all specific activities necessary to design,
order, and provide a specific product from concept through production, delivery, and post-
delivery support' - has a vision of "One Line, One Way, One Day." The idea as summarized in
Figure 1 is to have the ability to build engines and struts for the 747, 767 and 777 on the same
line using a common process, kits, installation plans, tools etc. The implementation of this
vision will increase production flexibility and be well aligned with the corporate goal of using
lean techniques to remain cost competitive and continuously eliminate waste.
http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2002/august/cover.html
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Figure 1 One Line, One Way, One Day
1.2 Engine Build-up Process
An engine is the single most expensive component of an airplane; it typically makes up
about a third of the cost of the entire airplane. The 777 for instance has a list price of USD 210
million2 and each of its two GE90 115B engine lists for USD 24 million.3
Engine build-up is an important aspect of airplane manufacturing. The process consists of the
assembly of specific components onto an engine core provided by manufacturers such as
General Electric, Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney. Some of the components installed by
Propulsion Systems Division (PSD) include integrated drive generator, pneumatic systems, wire
harnesses, pumps, fire detection system, and fan cowl support beam. Figures [2-7] show the
build process for the 777 engine from the time it is received from the supplier to delivery in
2 http://www.news.az/articles/turkey/24615
3 http://www.bangaloreaviation.com/2009/10/worlds-largest-aircraft-engine-ge9.html
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final assembly (FA). Once it is delivered to FA, a combination of tooling and cranes are used to
install the engine on the airplane wing.
Figure 2 Engine Attached to Supplier Buck and Moved into Build Area by Forklift
Figure 3 Mounts and Lift Tools Installed on the Engine
Figure 4 Engine Removed from Shipping Buck and Moved into Buildup Cell using Crane
Figure 5 Engine Installed in Buildup Cell, Ready for EBU
Figure 6 Engine Attached to Boeint Buck and Sent to Final Assembly by Forklift
Figure 7 Engine in Boeing Buck Positioned for Installation in Final Assembly
1.3 Problem Statement
Engine build-up in Boeing Commercial Airplanes is performed in two ways - using a
monorail or a buildup (work) cell; the monorail method [Figure 8] is the most widely used in the
company. In this setup, the engine is loaded onto the monorail by a crane which is part of the
monorail system. The suspended engine provides the mechanics unrestricted access and allows
them to manually push it back and forth. The work cell also requires the use of a crane for
lifting the engine however instead of using a monorail the engine is loaded into a static buildup
cell which does not allow the engine to be pushed manually. This method, similar to the
monorail also provides the mechanic unlimited access to the engine.
Figure 8 Engine on a Mono Rail
Both EBU methods require the use of capital intensive monuments which impedes the
flow of the EBU operation. These monuments occupy significant manufacturing space and
require multiple applications of crane moves which add considerable flow, handling and risk of
damage to the engine. Consequently the objective of the internship is to provide solutions
which eliminate the use of monuments and reduce product handling. Additionally the solutions
4 http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aviationservices/brochures/EngineBuildupServices.pdf
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must enable a safe working environment and quality workmanship during EBU, transportation
and engine installation on the airplane.
1.4 Approach
The implementation plan was divided into four broad categories namely identify
strategic motivation and objectives, propose options, analyze options and lastly provide
recommendations on how to perform future engine build-up. These categories were further
sub-divided as shown below.
Strategic motivation and obiectives
e Research and understand current EBU process
* Identify stakeholders and decision makers in the factory, engineering, supply chain,
research & technology, manufacturing and management
* Interview stakeholders and decision makers to determine the "right" problem to solve
Propose options
" Determine the airplane program to focus on
e Categorize installation components based on ease of mechanic access
e Compile list of stakeholder and decision maker requirements
e Score and rank requirements in order of importance
" Develop options which satisfy top ranked requirements
Analyze options
e Determine cost, time and space requirements
" Create concept designs for new tooling
* Develop and rank list of intangible benefits and risks
" Compare results with current EBU process
Provide recommendations
" Provide recommendations with supporting analysis
" Future consideration
- Create formal cross functional team for implementation
- Overcoming organizational challenges
1.5 Outline of Thesis
The following describes the content of the remainder of the thesis
Chapter 2 describes the commercial aerospace industry, major players and thoughts on the
future of the industry
Chapter 3 discusses the impact of lean in industry as well as its key attributes
Chapter 4 provides a case study of lean initiatives undertaken by propulsion systems
Chapter 5 dives into the analysis done to meet the objectives of the project
Chapter 6 offers final recommendations and observations based on the results of the project
and experience at Boeing
Chapter 2: Commercial Aerospace Industry
This chapter provides a background and analysis of the major players in the commercial
aerospace industry, as well as some insights on the future of the industry.
2.1 Boeing
Boeing is the world's largest aerospace company and leading manufacturer of
commercial jetliners and defense, space and security systems.5 The company is structured
under two major businesses units, Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) and Boeing Defense,
Space & Security (BDS). BCA is headquartered in the Puget Sound region of Washington state
and BDS in St. Louis, Missouri. Propulsion Systems, the division responsible for engine build-up
falls under the BCA business.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes has approximately 60,000 employees and 2009 revenues
of USD 34.1 billion out of overall Boeing revenue of USD 68.3 billion. Currently BCA's main
commercial products are 737, 747, 767 and 777 (triple seven) families of airplanes, with the 787
and 747-8 in development. These airplanes represent three quarters of the world's fleet with
nearly 12,000 jetliners in service.6 In addition, Boeing Commercial Airplanes also offers a broad
portfolio of aviation services through the Boeing Commercial Aviation Services group to its
passenger and cargo airline customers.
Total orders for 2007, 2008 and 2009 is 1330, 616 and 263 respectively. In the same
period Boeing has delivered 441, 375 and 481 airplanes. The 737, Boeing's short-to-medium-
range product, is the world's most successful and popular commercial airplane. The 737
s http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/brief.html
6 http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/brief.htm
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primarily utilizes engines manufactured by CFM International, a joint venture between Snecma
(SAFRAN Group) and General Electric (GE). 7 Current production rate is 31.5 per month with
plans to increase to 38 a month in 2013.8
The triple seven first entered service in 1995. It is the world's longest range twin engine
commercial airplane offering seating for over 300 passengers. Engine manufacturers for this jet
include GE, Pratt &Whitney and Rolls Royce, all of whom offer superior fuel efficiency. In 2009
Boeing delivered its 777th 777 airplane. The development of the revolutionary 787 Dreamliner
is currently underway. This airplane is made up of 50% composites versus 12% composites on
the triple seven. This makes the 787 Boeing's most fuel efficient aircraft and 20% more fuel
efficient than similar sized airplanes.9
2.2 Airbus
Airbus SAS, a subsidiary of European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, is a
leading aircraft manufacturer headquartered in Toulouse, France. Manufacturing, production
and sub-assembly of parts for Airbus aircraft are distributed around 12 sites in Europe, with
final assembly in Toulouse and Hamburg, Germany.' 0 In 2008 Airbus opened a final assembly
line in Tianjin China, its first outside Europe since the company was founded in 1970.
http://www.cfm56.com/company
8 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/boeing-to-speed-up-737-production-again-2010-09-17
9 http://www.boeing.com/commercial/787family/background.html
10 http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company-structure
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In 2009 Airbus' value of orders (based on catalog prices) is valued at USD 34.9 billion.
For the years 2007, 2008, and 2009, Airbus received orders for 1458, 900, and 310 airplanes
respectively. During the same period, the company delivered 453, 483, and 498 airplanes.
For much of the 1970s and 1980s, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas dominated the
commercial aircraft industry. Since its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas in 1997, Boeing is the
only US manufacturer of commercial aircrafts. Today Airbus is Boeing's single biggest
competitor in the commercial airplanes market. Airbus's rise is due to a series of successful
product launches. The A300 became the world's first twin-engine wide-body jet, entering
airline service in 1974. Airbus introduced the short-medium range A320 family of airplanes in
the late 1980s - which developed into one of the most successful aircraft families for the
company with the A318, A319, A320 and A321. The 1990s saw Airbus introduce its long range
A330/A340 jetliner family, and a new era of airline travel started in 2007 when the 525-seat
A380 began commercial operation. 12 Airbus is currently developing the A350 (delivery is
expected to begin in 2013), a long-range mid-size twin-engine aircraft. This aircraft is designed
to compete with the 777 and 787.
2.3 Bombardier
Bombardier is a transportation company founded by Joseph-Armand Bombardier and
headquartered in Montreal, Canada. The firm consists of two main businesses, aerospace and
rail transportation. The aerospace business unit manufactures products for several markets
including the commercial and business aircraft industries. Some notable commercial airplanes
"1 http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/orders-and_deliveries; 1989-2009 Results
12 http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company-evolution
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include the new C-Series program, CRJ Series and Q-Series aircraft families.' 3 Rail
transportation business manufactures rail equipment such as commuter trains and high speed
trains. Additionally the business provides services to its customers such as fleet maintenance
and signaling solutions for mass transit. 4
The CRJ series, introduced in 1992, is Bombardier's most popular and best-selling
aircraft. Since entering service over 1300 CRJs have been delivered and the market continues
to evolve. The aircraft is smaller than the 737 and A320 which allows utilizing of secondary
airports to fly to key destinations, avoiding traditional hub airports.15 This airplane caters to the
regional jet industry - a regional jet is a small short-range jet aircraft that is intended to fly
passengers from smaller airports to larger ones, thereby feeding the larger hubs with
passengers.'6 Bombardier's main competitor in the regional jet market is Embraer and
currently most of the deployment for CRJs has occurred within the United States and Europe.
2.4 Embraer
Embraer is an aircraft manufacturer based in Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil. The company
was formed in 1969 by the government of Brazil but privatized in 1994. It currently employs
more than 16,853 people, with 94.7% based in Brazil.' 7 Embraer produces commercial,
executive and military aircrafts. The ERJ series, a product of the commercial business competes
1 http://www.bombardier.com/en/corporate/about-us
14 http://www.bombardier.com/en/corporate/about-us?doclD=0901260d8000c432
1s http://www.crj.bombardier.com/CRJ/en/home.jsp
16 http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Regionaljet
17 http://www.embraer.com/english/content/empresa/profile.asp
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with Bombardier's CRJ airplane. It was introduced in 1996 and Embraer has produced and
delivered more than 1000 of them since then.18
2.5 Industry Analysis
Historically the commercial aerospace industry is a cyclical business. The period leading
to the dot.com crash was a prosperous period for the industry. Following the crash, business
travel declined which affected the airline industry. The events of 9/11 further exacerbated the
challenges in the airline industry with a continued decrease in air travel.
Threat of new Entrants: This is a medium threat because the high capital cost of equipment
required to manufacture an airplane has kept new entrants out of the market. Additionally the
complexity of the airplane makes it difficult to automate hence labor cost is generally high. In
countries where the government provides subsidies to become a major airplane manufacturer,
then the threat of new entrants will be high.
Bargaining power of Buyers: Many major airlines have a mix of airplane fleet hence their
personnel is familiar with the differences between airplane manufacturers. There is low
differentiation in the technologies between manufacturers hence airline personnel could be
quickly trained. In general, the airlines have a low switching cost when it comes to selecting
between manufacturers hence manufacturers are forced to engage in price competitions with
one another. This makes this force strong.
Threat of Substitute products: This is a low threat. The airplane is a complex and sophisticated
piece of equipment. For short distances other modes of transportation could be used in lieu of
18 http://www.embraer.com/english/content/empresa/profile.asp?tela=commercialaviation
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an airplane but in general no product has come close to the speed at which an airplane can
transport passengers to various destinations.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers: This is a low threat. There are many suppliers in the industry
and airplane manufacturers can cross geographic boundaries to find the best price. As
manufacturers are becoming more integrators and suppliers more of the technology experts, it
is conceivable this may become a stronger threat.
Rivalry among Existing Firms: The competition among existing firms is high. For years Boeing
dominated the industry but today Airbus has a slight edge in terms of commercial aircraft sales.
Smaller players such as Bombardier and Embraer are also growing and could soon develop
products which rival the 737 and the A320 family of products. This rivalry is expected to
intensify moving forward.
2.6 Summary
Given the low differentiation between products and the mature nature of the industry,
companies need to continue to drive for operational excellence. Out-dated manufacturing
techniques need to be replaced with new technology that allow for flexibility and reduction of
waste. Companies who can manufacture airplanes for the lowest cost and pass these savings to
airlines will be poised to remain relevant. Those who can innovate and respond to the razor
thin margins in the airline industry are likely to be the most successful moving forward.
Chapter 3: Literature Review
This chapter discusses previous studies examining how lean manufacturing
revolutionized various industries including aerospace.
3.1 Lean Manufacturing
The practice of Lean Manufacturing - also known as Lean - has been a subject of
fascination for academics and businesses since the release of the international best seller "The
Machine that Changed the World," which was co-authored by Daniel Roos, James Womack and
Daniel Jones. In their analysis, Roos et al discuss the move of the world from mass production -
made popular at the Ford Motor Company - to lean production which is widely practiced by
Japanese manufacturers. Today a quick search on the internet for lean produces a plethora of
definitions. At the Boeing Company, lean is defined as a "systematic, continuous improvement
approach that focuses on the relentless elimination of waste."19 From the manufacturing to
financial services to health care sectors, lean techniques have revolutionized the way many
organizations conduct business today.
According to a study "The Lean Benchmark Report: Closing the Reality Gap," written in
2006 by Jane Biddle of the Aberdeen Group, there are three main categories of companies
based on their lean practices and performance. These are Best in class, Industry average and
Laggard. Best in class as the name suggests are the most sophisticated in this group. They are
companies who have embraced lean and made it part of their corporate culture - Toyota Motor
Corporation is the most famous example. Their techniques are currently being employed as
19 Boeing Internal Intranet; Lean
best practices and are considered advanced when compared to industry standards. Industry
average represents firms who have implemented lean in some areas of their business but are
yet to deploy it companywide. In these firms, lean practices tend to occur in silos which hinder
the creation of a corporate lean culture required to become best-in-class. The final group,
Laggard, describes organizations that are primitive with regards to lean adoption. These firms
are just learning the benefits of leaning-out their operations and in some cases encounter
significant resistance in the implementation.
For companies that are considered best-in-class, the adoption of lean extends beyond
the company. In many cases suppliers also have to adopt the same culture in order to reap the
full benefits of a lean operation. For instance just-in-time (JIT) which is a technique in lean is
described as an inventory system in which materials, parts, sub-assemblies, and support items
are delivered just when needed, neither sooner nor later.20 One can see how a company can
quickly run into difficulty if they employ a JIT inventory strategy and the suppliers do not.
According to Biddle's research, companies who are most successful with their lean initiatives
have these top three strategic actions in common:
1. Reduce non-value added manufacturing and supply chain costs
2. Implement continuous improvement culture and methods
3. Improve manufacturing and supply chain flexibility
Figure 9 shows a full list of strategic actions found to be common with Best in class firms.
20 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/just-in-time-JIT-inventory.html
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Reduce non value-added manufacturing and supply chain costs
Implement continuous improvement culture and methods
Improve manufacturing and supply chain flexibility
Customer demand driven manufacturing
Focus on customer value-adding activities
Reduce inventory and assets required to produce and deliver product
Improve product quality
66%
52%
38%
29%
27%
27%
20%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 21
Figure 9: Best-in-Class Strategic Actions
3.2 Role of Continuous Improvement
The philosophy of continual improvement implies a sustained activity i.e. it is not a one-
time initiative but instead a mode of operating which requires significant change management.
Several books have been written on continuous improvement, most notable Eliyahu Goldratt's
Theory of Constraints in "The Goal." Goldratt presents an approach to continuous
improvement focusing on resource limitations and the removal of constraints to increase
throughput and reduce cost.22 Six sigma is also a widely applied process improvement
methodology which relies on statistical tools to improve the quality of products. This approach
seeks to minimize variability and remove defects from the manufacturing process.
3.3 Role of Production Flexibility
Researching the topic of production flexibility reveals the difficulty associated with
converging on a widely accepted definition. In classifying flexibilities, Azzone and Bertele
21 The Lean Benchmark Report: Closing the Reality Gap
2 Boeing Internal Intranet; Theory of Constraints
(1989) define production flexibility as "the probability that the manufacturing system will be
able to process a new product." Roos et al describe a craft producer, mass producer and lean
producer. The craft producer offers customers exactly what they request using flexible tools.
However this comes at a high cost. Mass production offers a high volume of products but low
variety and typically results in single-purpose tools which are not flexible. The lean producer
combines the benefits of craft production and mass production - flexible tools which produce a
variety of products in high volumes. The ability to use one tool for multiple production
activities helps a company lower investment and maintenance costs.
3.4 Role of Change Management
In "True Change" Janice Klein discusses the need for outsiders operating on the inside of
organizations (outsider-insiders) to build lasting change. Klein notes how changes in corporate
level strategy - which may be triggered by a variety of reasons such as political and economic
factors - can cause misalignment at the working or functional level. As Klein illustrates, the
tragedy of September 11 forced airline companies to reevaluate their pricing and operations.
Similarly the collapse of Enron exposed the conflict of interest associated with Arthur Anderson
being an auditor to a client and at the same time selling the client consulting services. Klein
explains how this misalignment at the working level creates an opportunity for outsider-insiders
to introduce new ideas within their functional group to achieve the new strategic objective of
the company. This is illustrated in Figure 10.
Compet iivei/olitial
Environnment
orgainizat ional chauenges
Sirategics
IMICI~I)
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Figure 10 Aligning Strategic and Local-Level Change
The introduction of new ideas creates an organizational challenge in terms of resistance
to change. Hence outsider-insiders have a significant role to play in overcoming this challenge.
Klein's case study on American Diesel Corporation's (ADC) introduction of a new lean
manufacturing strategy analyzes the resistance to change at the company's Sedalia Engine
Plant. Ultimately true change did not occur in the Sedalia engine plant until after employees
came to understand the need and benefits of adopting new work practices in order to respond
to changes in the macro environment.
3.5 Summary
The main idea of lean is doing more with less i.e. less tools, space, human effort etc.
When an organization is meeting its objectives and customers are happy, new ideas are tough
to implement. Klein points out "past successes can also blind people to alternative solutions."
Propulsion Systems at the Boeing Company has over thirty years of experience with engine
buildup and have delivered high quality engines to customers for years therefore improvement
ideas are more difficult to push. Success according to Klein depends on three essential
23 True Change
fundamentals: people (outsider-insiders), individual and organizational commitment and a
willingness to evolve as the organization grows. As W Edwards Deming noted, "implementation
of a lean production system is not for the timid, the faint-hearted or those who expect quick
results. However, the good news is that a world-class production system can be built one small
improvement at a time" (Black, 2009).
Chapter 4: Lean Manufacturing at Boeing
For years Boeing was the number one producer of commercial airplanes. Orders were
pouring in and margins were high. Like most monopolies, the push to become more efficient
and strive for operational excellence is a difficult sell when business is great. The 1970s was an
interesting decade for the US manufacturing industry. There was increasing competition from
overseas and US companies began to realize they needed to change the way they were doing
business. In the early 1970s, Boeing for instance went more than a year without a single order
(Black, 2009). Around the same time Airbus entered the commercial airplane business and
today stands as Boeing's single biggest competitor. Figure 11 shows the growth of Airbus in the
last 30 years.
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Figure 11 Competitive Landscape
24 Internal Boeing Intranet; Airplane Programs Lean Journey by Carolyn Corvi
32
To lead the journey of striving for operational excellence and becoming a lean
organization, Boeing introduced what was called quality improvement in the late 1970s and has
since evolved into the Boeing Production System (BPS). As part of the overall corporate
strategy of developing a lean organization, Boeing has gone through a series of initiatives, two
of which are used as case studies in the remainder of this chapter.
4.1737 Production Line
The 737 airplane was first introduced in 1966 and since then manufacturing methods
have evolved tremendously. 25 Up until 2001, 737's production essentially functioned as a
traditional factory, ridden with issues such as excess inventory, production status of the factory
not visible, flow times not correlated to customers and tools, parts and drawings not readily
available to mechanics. 26 Figure 12 and 13 shows a visual of the 737 factory floor before and
after the lean implementation.
25 http://www.b737.org.uk/production.htm
http://www.nsrp.org/industryInitiatives/lean shipbuilding-initiative/lean/presentations/4a.pdf
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Figure 12 737 Before Lean - The Beginning
Figure 13 737 After Lean -The Journey Continues
Beginning in 2001 Boeing embarked on a lean journey for the 737 airplane. The
company became the first commercial airplane manufacturer to use Henry Ford's concept of a
moving assembly line to build jetliners.29 The moving line concept was part of a 9-Step Plan 30
27 Internal Boeing Intranet; Airplane Programs Lean Journey by Carolyn Corvi
28 Internal Boeing Intranet; Airplane Programs Lean Journey by Carolyn Corvi
29 http://www.b737.org.uk/production.htm
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developed by Boeing to completely transform airplane production; some results are shown in
Table 1. Transformation of the 737 production line also necessitated a lean transformation
among suppliers. Propulsion systems, through a series of initiatives, was able to reduce unit
time flow for 737 engine build-up from 3 days to 1 day as well as achieve a 66% inventory
reduction per ship set.
Wing Manufacturing Final Assembly Pre-flight and Delivery
e Flow Time Reduced by 40% * Flow Time Reduced by 50% e Flow Time Reduced by 33%
e Unit Hours Reduced by 16% e Unit Hours Reduced by 33% e Unit Hours Reduced by 43%
Table 1 737 Lean Implementation Progress, 2001 - 2008
4.2 Factory Relocation
In order to fully utilize efficiencies gained in the Boeing Production System, Boeing
Commercial Airplanes determined it was imperative to find ways to properly align the skills and
resources of propulsion systems staff through the business. The idea was that this alignment
would help create new opportunities to reduce airplane production costs, improve processes,
reduce flow times, and improve quality.32 This initiative was termed "Move to the Future" and
resulted in the relocation of propulsion systems factory operations and support personnel from
their south Seattle location to final assembly in Renton (737) and Everett (747, 767 and 777).
In the case of the 737 move propulsion systems was able to be located line side as a
feeder line next to final assembly (FA). This direct connection between the supplier (Propulsion
Systems) and the customer (FA) has helped the Boeing Company improve effectiveness and
30 Appendix
3 http://www.nsrp.org/IndustryInitiatives/leanshipbuilding_initiative/lean/presentations/4a.pdf
3 Boeing Internal Intranet
efficiency throughout the 737 production line. Other intangible benefits have also been
realized such as increased communication and skill development among propulsion and final
assembly personnel. On the other hand Propulsion Systems for the Everett airplane programs
was moved into a separate building [Figure 14] than final assembly. This was primarily due to
two reasons. First the space needed for the support services of the multi-model airplane
programs in Everett exceeds the requirements in Renton. Secondly the engines as well as the
tools needed for engine build-up also require more physical space than the 737. Ultimately
moving the Everett engine build-up and all other PSD work line side to FA will provide Boeing
with an opportunity to realize the same feeder line gains as the 737.
777 EBU PCA 767/747/-8 767/747/-8/777 Struts LRA
IAPU'sT
PCA Restroom Tool Room PCA PCA
Figure 14 Building Layout of Everett PSD 3
3 The "777 EBU" space measures approximately 86,000 sq. ft. The work cells used for EBU are installed in this
work area
Parts Control Area (PCA): Area parts are stored until needed
Local Receiving Area (LRA): Area where parts are received
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4.3 Summary
In the early stages of Lean, Propulsion Systems had several initiatives that were
implemented locally but never duplicated in FA. It was only after management began to look at
both groups as a system that these gains were realized throughout the value stream. The
change management aspects of this lean implementation were real and significant. Some
workers had to face additional commute time as the factory was relocated. Others had to begin
sharing resources particularly in engineering. Management was able to overcome the
resistance to change by spending significant amount of time listening to people's concerns.
This helped arrive at creative ways of alleviating some of the pain associated with the changes
and ultimately contributed to propulsion systems and final assembly implementing these lean
initiatives.
Chapter 5: Business Case Analysis
This chapter discusses the analysis of the four proposed solutions for meeting the
objectives of the internship. These solutions as discussed in sections 5.3 through 5.6 include
Full Ownership, Partial Ownership, New Buck Design and Work Flow Changes. The analysis was
done using an Excel based financial model which was originally developed by Boeing but
customized for this internship. The actual values used in the model were generally obtained
from two sources. First by working with subject matter experts at Boeing to estimate input
factors e.g. the number of hours needed for employee training. Secondly, by performing
multiple time studies to record the time it took for mechanics to perform tasks associated with
engine build-up.
5.1 Assumptions and Input Factors
Assumptions34
0 First Year of Cash Flows: 2012
0 Start Month of Cash Flows: January
e Base Year: 2012
0 End Year: 2021
* After Tax Discount Rate: 10.5%
* Weighted Average Cost of Capital: 10.5%
e 7 year depreciation schedule on asset purchases
The input factors for the model were divided into 3 categories: capital costs, non-
recurring costs and recurring costs.
Capital Costs
e Engineering: design engineering cost for developing CATIA model for new tool - CATIA is a
three dimensional product design software
" Tooling Hardware: the cost for building new bucks
e Supporting Hardware: cost for all other hardware other than the buck e.g. ladders and jacks
3 Values were provided by Boeing Commercial Airplanes Finance Organization
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Non-Recurring Costs
e Contract Negotiation: administrative labor costs for drafting a new statement of work with
the engine supplier
e Supply Chain Changes: administrative labor costs to change the supply chain
* Installation Plan Revision: manufacturing engineering labor cost to revise installation plan
for EBU
" Move/Relocate Tools: manufacturing labor costs for decommissioning and sending EBU
tools to the supplier 35
e On the Job Training (OJT): employee training on new EBU process
Recurring Costs
* Employee Labor: manufacturing labor costs for EBU
e Transfer of Work: supplier charge for performing Boeing statement of work. This is typically
a lump sum which covers factors such as labor, manufacturing space and tooling costs.
e Supplier Management Activities: on-going management of supplier contract to ensure the
contractual agreement to Boeing are met
e Supplier Delay: cost to Boeing if supplier does not deliver the engine on-time
* Inventory Holding Costs: Boeing's inventory holding costs
e Out of Contract Work: cost to Boeing if supplier performs additional work not specified in
the contract
* Manufacturing Space Requirements: cost of the physical floor space required for all EBU
e Tooling PM Costs: preventative maintenance and inspection cost for EBU tools
3s Scrap value of tools and equipment was found to be negligible hence was not included in the analysis
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Supplier Banked Material (SBM): cost of storing Boeing owned material at the supplier's
facility
Other Terms
e Bonded stores agreement: an agreement between Boeing and a supplier for storing Boeing
owned parts
" Payback: the length of time it takes to recover the initial cost of a project, without regard to
the time value of money36
e Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR): financial measure of an investment's
attractiveness. The MIRR assumes that positive cash flows are reinvested at the
firm's cost of capital, and the initial outlays are financed at the firm's financing cost.37
Production Rates
The 777 airplane is currently on a 60 per year build rate with plans to increase annual
production to 84 airplanes by 2011. Figure 15 shows production for the 777 peaked in 1998 and
2008. In order to take a conservative approach to estimating demand in 2021 (end year), a
linear regression was performed on the data from 2006 to 2010 [Figure 16]. The result is an
estimated demand of 67.56 airplanes in 2021 or 5.63 airplanes per month. This number is used
in the analysis of the four proposed options discussed in sections 5.3 through 5.6.
36 http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Payback
3 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mirr.asp
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Figure 16 777 Delivery - 2006 to 2010
5.3 Full Ownership
Full ownership explores the option of outsourcing EBU to engine suppliers.
The big three aero-engine manufacturers - General Electric, Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney -
have evolved from solely designing and manufacturing jet engines to servicing these products
for customers globally. GE for instance began servicing jet engines more than 50 years ago.
Today the company provides services such as Engine Exchange and On Wing Support.38 This
diversification has enabled engine suppliers to gain experience with EBU.
Under the full ownership model Boeing coordinates the purchase of all parts and
material needed for EBU. These parts are drop shipped to the engine supplier and a Bonded
Stores Agreement is setup to manage the inventory. Table 2 shows a list of all the input factors
considered for full ownership.
Non-Recurring Costs
* Supply Chain Changes
" Contract Negotiation
* Move/Relocate Tools
Recurring Costs
* Employee Labor
* Transfer of Work
* Supplier Management Activities
* Supplier Delay
Inventory Holding Costs
* Out of Contract Work
* Manufacturing Space Requirements
* Tooling PM Costs
e Supplier Banked Material
Table 2 Full Ownership Input Factors
From Table 2, the factors which emerged as the major costs to Boeing are supplier
banked material (SBM) and transfer of work. SBM assumes a 20% markup over current
38 http://www.geae.com/services/
inventory holding costs. 39 Transfer of work assumes a 10% markup over Boeing's current labor
costs.44 Non-recurring costs are estimated at about $280,000. Since this option eliminates the
need for the existing EBU manufacturing space - greater than 86,000 square feet - full
ownership results in a recurring savings to Propulsion Systems. These savings are internal to
Propulsion Systems only, Boeing as a whole does not realize any tangible savings from this
reduction in manufacturing space. However freeing up this space allows Boeing to explore
alternate uses for it. The option generates positive cash flows from the base year to the end
year [Figure 17] and the cumulative cash flows plot overlaps with economic profit resulting in a
payback of less than a year.
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Figure 17 Full Ownership Cash Flows
5.4 Partial Ownership
Partial ownership is the first of the next three solutions that explore the possibility of
building the engine in a buck. At the time of the internship, EBU utilized two bucks - one
39 This data is Boeing proprietary
40 Markup percentages were calculated based on historical data obtained from Boeing subject matter experts
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supplier owned, one Boeing owned. The supplier buck is used to ship the engine to Boeing
from the supplier's facility while the Boeing buck is used to transport a completed engine to
Final Assembly. The design of both bucks prevents mechanics from performing engine build-up
because the bucks do not provide adequate access to all sections of the engine. As a result,
partial ownership proposes adding rotational capability to the Boeing buck in both clockwise
and counter-clockwise directions. This new buck is called a rotating engine buck or REB. Work
Flow Changes which is discussed in section 5.6 also utilizes a REB. The Boeing owned buck was
selected over the supplier buck for this modification because tools used in final assembly to
install the engine were designed to work with the Boeing buck. Selecting the supplier buck
instead would have been cost prohibitive because it requires a redesign of final assembly's
engine installation tools as well.
The REB will utilize the same footprint as the Boeing buck and have the ability to rotate
45 degrees. Preliminary studies indicate some components will still be difficult to install in the
REB e.g. integrated drive generator and variable speed constant frequency drive - hereby
known as limited access components (LAC) - hence the engine buildup statement of work is
split between the supplier and PSD. The supplier installs the LAC prior to shipping the engine to
Boeing (Transfer of Work) and PSD completes engine build-up in the REB. Table 3 shows a
complete list of the factors considered for partial ownership.
Capital Cost Non-Recurring Costs Recurring Costs
" Engineering e On the Job Training e Employee Labor
* Tooling Hardware e Supply Chain Changes * Transfer of Work
" Supporting Hardware e Contract Negotiation e Supplier Management Activities
Installation Plan Changes e Supplier Delay
e Inventory Holding Costs
e Out of Contract Work
* Manufacturing Space Requirements
e Tooling PM Costs
e Supplier Banked Material
Table 3 Partial Ownership Input Factors
The costs for SBM and transfer of work under partial ownership are negligible because
only a few parts are needed to be installed by the supplier. However total non-recurring costs
are higher in comparison to full ownership - $850,000 versus $280,000. This increase is mostly
attributed to the training needed for Propulsion Systems' employees on how to perform engine
buildup in the rotating buck as well as Boeing's contract negotiation process with the supplier.
The use of REBs over monuments results in a 50% reduction in manufacturing floor space,
which accounts for most of the savings under partial ownership. A capital investment of $2.5M
on hardware modifications and design is required, resulting in a payback of 3 years and a
modified internal rate of return (MIRR) of 22.9% [Figure 18].
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Figure 18 Partial Ownership Cash Flows
5.5 New Buck Design
This option requires the highest amount of capital - $4.1M - of the 4 proposed options.
It entails a substantial investment in brand new tools instead of a modification of the Boeing
buck as described under partial ownership. A state of the art buck is designed using
sophisticated motion control technology which includes a programmable logic controller (PLC)
and an intuitive human machine interface (HM I). This buck is still expected to have a similar
footprint as the existing Boeing buck however the sophisticated control systems technology will
allow mechanics to perform all necessary maneuvers required to gain access to the engine
during buildup. The entire engine build-up work statement will belong to PSD since easy
accessibility of all components will be built into the design of the buck.
Table 4 shows the input factors considered for new buck design. On the job training is
estimated to add about $640,000 in non-recurring costs. This accounts for the learning curve
expected with using new sophisticated tools for EBU. Since the existing monuments will no
longer be utilized the savings from this option come primarily from a reduction in
manufacturing floor space. Payback for this investment occurs after 5 years and generates a
MIRR of less than 15% [Figure 19].
Capital Cost Non-Recurring Costs Recurring Costs
e Engineering e On the Job Training e Manufacturing Space Requirements
e Tooling Hardware 
* Tooling PM Costs
* Supporting Hardware
Table 4 New Buck Design Input Factors
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Figure 19 New Buck Design Cash Flows
5.6 Work Flow Changes
Work Flow Changes which is the last option analyzed is similar to partial ownership i.e. it
uses the same rotating engine buck proposed for engine build-up and requires a capital
investment of $2.5M. However instead of moving the statement of work for the limited access
components (LAC) upstream to the supplier it is pushed downstream to final assembly. The
rationale is that once the engine is installed on the aircraft's wing, mechanics will have the
required access to the bottom of the engine - which is where the LAC is installed. Table 5
shows a list of all the input factors considered for work flow changes. Non-recurring costs are
estimated to be about $700,000 and manufacturing space is reduced by 50%. The investment
payback is about 3.5 years with a MIRR of approximately 20% [Figure 20].
Capital Cost Non-Recurring Costs Recurring Costs
* Engineering 0 On the Job Training 0 Manufacturing Space Requirements
* Tooling Hardware e Installation Plan Changes 0 Tooling PM Costs
" Supporting Hardware * Move/Relocate Tools
Table 5 Work Flow Changes Input Factors
After Tax Dollars (in 000's)
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5.7 Conclusions
Table 6 shows a comparison of the aforementioned proposed solutions. Full ownership
offers the quickest payback and highest rate of return. It also generates recurring savings and
has the lowest non-recurring costs of the four options presented. In talking to PSD staff, new
buck design - which is the least cost effective - is the most desirable out of the proposed
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solutions because it keeps all the EBU work statement within PSD. However it offers the
highest recurring costs, lowest rate of return, and the longest payback period.
Partial ownership and work flow changes have identical capital costs. The rates of
return and payback for these two options are also similar and the recurring costs are medium in
comparison to full ownership and new buck design. Partial ownership and work flow changes
offer a hybrid approach where PSD performs the majority of EBU. The difference is that with
partial ownership, installation of the limited access components (LAC) is performed by the
engine suppliers whereas with work flow changes the LAC are installed in final assembly.
Capital Costs Non-Recurring Costs Recurring Costs MIRR Payback
N/A Low *savings High 1year
$2.5M High Medium 22.9% 3 years
$4.1M Medium High 15% 5 years
$2.5M Medium Medium 20% 3.5 years
Table 6 Comparison of Options
Chapter 6 Recommendation and Observations
This chapter covers the rationale used to arrive at the final recommendation and
discusses them. Furthermore observations of the organizational dynamics at Boeing and its role
in this project will be covered as well as future considerations.
6.1 Recommendation Considerations
As stated at the beginning of this thesis, Boeing's adoption of Lean Manufacturing and
Propulsion Systems' vision of "One Line, One Way, One Day" is the strategic motivation for this
project. Given the time frame of the internship the focus was narrowed to engine build-up for
the GE90-115B 777 airplane engine. This engine is the most commonly used on a 777 airplane
and the biggest (size wise) on all existing Boeing commercial airplanes. The expectation is that
a solution for this engine will be easier to scale down to the smaller engines versus trying to
scale up to a large engine.
For some time Propulsion systems has been re-evaluating the EBU process in order to
determine better ways to perform it. The division undertook a series of 3P (production
preparation process) workshops and the outcome was to design an engine buck that would
allow for buildup to occur in it - a 3P rapidly creates and validates potential product and
process designs that require the least time, material, and capital resources.41 A prototype was
built and piloted a few times but was never fully adopted by Propulsion systems due in part to
insufficient/inconclusive financial analysis and organizational challenges - discussed later in
section 6.3. Since Boeing already had a potential solution from the 3P study, the original scope
41 http://www.mmtc.org/Lean/PDF/3P_2009.pdf
of this internship was limited to developing concepts for a tool that would allow engine build-
up (EBU) to occur in a buck. However the scope was expanded in order to explore other
solutions that would also meet the objectives of the project. This led to the analysis of the four
proposed options - Full Ownership, Partial Ownership, New Buck Design and Work Flow
Changes. The final recommendations to Boeing take into account the following considerations:
Cost of the Option, Ability to Perform Work and Boeing Practice.
Cost of Option
From a financial perspective designing a new buck as the original project proposal
stipulated is the most expensive option because it requires significant hardware and
engineering design costs. By contrast, full ownership is the most cost effective solution
because it requires no capital cost, offers the shortest payback and the highest rate of return.
Partial ownership and work flow changes lie between these two cost boundaries - $2.5M capital
investment each. If Boeing's decision was based solely on the results of the financial analysis
outsourcing as described above, full ownership would be the recommended solution.
Ability to Perform Work
This decision consideration examines how well EBU can be performed by the supplier
when compared to propulsion systems. The assumption here is that the airplane program is
already in full production and beyond the early development and flight test phase which
typically requires significant rework, engineering changes etc.
Full and partial ownership involve increasing the work statement of the engine suppliers
as explained in Chapter 5. At first glance these options seem to expose Boeing to a higher risk
of low product quality and schedule delays because it requires a greater reliance on the
suppliers. However these risks are minimal because engine suppliers have gained significant
experience with EBU over the years. The expectation is that suppliers will be able to perform
the work statement at the same rate, quality and cost as Boeing. A potential risk under this
decision factor is the supplier's ability to perform out of contract work42 if required by Boeing.
For instance Boeing could experience delays in sending the supplier the right parts on time. As
a result Boeing could ask the supplier to work overtime in order to meet any EBU schedule
deadlines. If this occurs, two issues typically arise. First the supplier may not have the
resources readily available to perform the work statement. Secondly, the supplier may charge a
hefty premium as a way to cover their own internal costs. New Buck Design would be the
recommended solution if Boeing's decision were based solely on the ability to perform out of
contract work. However historical data reveals PSD rarely works overtime due to a late
shipment from suppliers i.e. parts tend to arrive on time to PSD. Additionally overtime work
within PSD due to internal factors is also a rare occurrence hence the expectation is that the
risk of asking the supplier to perform out of contract work is minimal.
Boeing Practice
Traditionally Boeing issues payment based on the supplier providing all parts and
material. Occasionally when it is beneficial to the company to deviate from this practice,
Boeing stores its parts at a supplier's facility (SBM). In other words, Boeing orders parts from a
supplier and these parts are shipped to another supplier's facility. In speaking with experts at
Boeing, SBM has historically been a temporary solution. Hence even though full and partial
ownership are the most cost effective options, Boeing's preferred method of operating dictates
4 Any additional work performed by the supplier which was not specified in the original contract
these solutions should be eliminated because they call for Boeing to setup SBM on a permanent
basis. Assuming Boeing decides to continue this practice, work flow changes would be
recommended as the new EBU solution.
6.2 Scenario Discussion
This section discusses the requirements for the two leading options - full ownership and
work flow changes - which emerged from section 6.1.
Full Ownership (Outsourcing)
The topic of outsourcing has been widely studied by academics and business
professionals for years. Companies such as Boeing who outsource do so for a variety of reasons
including cost savings, to gain access to capital and capacity management. According to a paper
(David Pritchard & Alan MacPherson, 2005), Boeing "has opted for a systems integration mode
of production. Under this system, key components and sub-assemblies are designed and
manufactured by external suppliers." Charles Fine in his 1998 book "Clock Speed: Winning
Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage" discusses how companies should be
deliberate in their project selection by focusing on maximizing competitive advantage. Fine
goes on to examine the outsourcing issue - make versus buy decision - along a 2 by 2 matrix
made up of dependencies [Table 7].
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Table 7 Matrix of Organizational Dependency and Product Decomposability
A careful study of Propulsion Systems reveals engine build-up falls in the upper right
quadrant of the matrix and thus presents Boeing with what Fine describes as the "best
outsourcing opportunity." The idea of outsourcing EBU - full ownership - was not well
received by employees in Propulsion Systems because the general feeling is that the supplier
cannot perform the work as well and as cost effectively as Boeing does. It became obvious
through the course of the project that the opposite is true. Suppliers are just as competent as
PSD when it comes to EBU however outsourcing introduces issues with job security.
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
District 751 is a union which represents 45,000 active, retired and laid-off workers at The
Boeing Company in Puget Sound and California." The Society of Professional Engineering
Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), IFPTE Local 2001, is also a union which represents 24,100
43 Clock Speed Page 169
44 http://www.iam751.org/pages/about751.htm
Item is modular (decom posable)
Item is integral (not
decomposable)
engineers, technical workers and other professionals at Boeing.45 The collective bargaining
agreement in both unions adds a layer of complexity to outsourcing decisions when it
eliminates the jobs of those represented by the union. For instance Contract 21.7 of IAM 751
addresses outsourcing - also known as subcontracting - and it stipulates "the company
(Boeing) agrees that employees will not be laid off as a direct result of subcontracting or
offloading work unless they are unwilling to change jobs (including a downgrade), shift, or
locations within the bargaining unit." 46 However, this agreement does not apply to strategic
work placements i.e. decisions made primarily for strategic considerations. In cases where
subcontracting affects the job of at least ten employees, union representatives actively
participate in the decision process in order to propose alternatives that are as financially sound
and allow the retention of work. SPEEA has a similar policy to outsourcing. Therefore full
ownership requires management's involvement of union representatives early on in the
process as described above.
Work Flow Changes (Rotating Engine Buck)
The original idea was to have the rotating engine buck (REB) cycle between the engine
supplier, propulsion systems and final assembly. From a lean manufacturing perspective this
would have offered the greatest tool flexibility because the REB could now be used for multiple
purposes - transportation, EBU and engine installation. However, the desire for flexibility had
to be tempered with its financial viability.
At the time of the project approximately fifteen (15) bucks cycled between the supplier
and propulsion systems. As a rough estimate these 15 bucks were assumed to be the minimum
4s http://www.speea.org/ContactUs/About_Us. html
4 http://www.iam751.org/2008Proposal/Article21/Article_2 1.htm
55
number of bucks required to cycle between the supplier, propulsion systems and final
assembly.47 Running the financial model with 15 bucks requires a capital investment of $9.4M,
with a MIRR of 6.1% and payback of 9.5 years [Figure 21].
After Tax Dollars(in 000's)
$2000
-AMA~ Einrmp Lh-4*I
-CminhFbwAftr Tm
so CumEowocPmt
($2000)
($4000) T
0
($6 000)
(48 000)
($10,000)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2W9 2020 2021
Figure 21 Fifteen Bucks
Since this investment does not make good business sense, it was determined that cycling the
REBs between propulsion systems and final assembly alone was a more cost effective
alternative because it reduces the total number needed from over 15 to just 6. The required
capital investment was also reduced from $9.4M to $2.5M, a 73% decrease. These 6 REBs were
determined to be the optimum number based on the following assumptions:
0 3 days of flow in PSD
* 5 days of flow in FA
e FA will install the engine by day 3
Figure 22 shows the process used to arrive at the final number of REBs needed. The white
columns represent weekdays when PSD works and the grey columns represent the weekend
47 More than 15 bucks would be required once final assembly is included in the buck's cycle time
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when PSD does not currently work. 777 engines are built in pairs therefore each colored box
represents 2 bucks. For instance, assuming PSD ships a completed engine to final assembly on
October 5 and begins a new build on October 6, final assembly would return the pair of bucks
they received from PSD by October 8 (the 3rd day of flow). Following this reasoning, only 4
REBs are required to cycle between PSD and final assembly however for contingency purposes
2 were are as spares. This brings the total number of REBs needed to 6.
2010
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Figures 23 to 25 show the CATIA concepts developed for the rotating engine buck.
These concepts utilize the footprint of the Boeing owned bucks that were being used at the
time of the project to transport a completed engine to final assembly. This was done because
the tool used in final assembly for engine installation attaches to the base of the Boeing owned
bucks and it was determined maintaining the existing footprint but adding a cradle for rotating
capability would result in substantial savings of time and resources for the Boeing Company.
Figure 23 REB Top View
Figure 24 REB Side View with Engine
Figure 25 REB Aft View with Engine
6.3 Organizational Dynamics
Much of the recommendations for driving change in the remainder of this thesis come
from John Cotter's 1996 book "Leading Change." Here he presents real world ideas of what
seems to work and doesn't in organizations seeking to implement change.
Propulsion Systems is well respected throughout Boeing because of a proven track
record of delivering engines on time to final assembly. While this record of success is desirable
in any organization, it can lead to an atmosphere where employees cling to the status quo and
resist change initiatives. Kotter describes eight errors common to organizational change
efforts, three of which were observed during the internship. First is the issue of complacency.
Employees in propulsion systems generally lack the urgency required to make changes to the
engine build-up process. Many employees, from the shop floor to management have been in
the group for years and have mastered all the manufacturing processes. Additionally they are
constantly reminded of how well they perform in engine delivery hence many do not see a
need to make changes. As Kotter notes in his book, "without a sense of urgency, people won't
give that extra effort that is often essential." 48
The second observation is this project was supported only by a select few. Shop floor
employees, engineering and a few other key management individuals were either unaware or
unsupportive of the project. This creates difficulty in gaining any sustainable progress on a
change initiative. Additionally a project team did not exist and as Kotter notes "individuals
alone, no matter how competent or charismatic never have all the assets needed to overcome
tradition and inertia except in very small organizations." 49
The final observation addresses the communication of PSD's vision - One Line, One Way,
One Day. Key people in PSD did not see the alignment between the project and the vision
hence it was difficult to generate excitement. This lack of clarity caused a sizeable number of
employees to disagree with the need for changing the EBU process. Also the customer - final
assembly - was largely unaware of PSD's vision and desire to make changes to EBU. Kotter
discusses how managers have a tendency to think of their immediate groups only and not the
broader stakeholders who need to support the vision as well.
While final assembly and propulsion systems collaborate on several things, the turf wars
between the two groups particularly on the shop floor is apparent. Each group wants to be in
control of their resources and work, without having to accommodate other groups. Final
assembly is used to receiving a completed engine hence they do not want PSD performing any
work in their workspace and likewise PSD does not want final assembly to interfere with their
EBU process. The feeling on the shop floor in final assembly is that if a portion of the EBU work
48 Leading Change Page 5
49 Leading Change Page 6
statement needs to be transferred to their group - as is the case with work flow changes - then
the work would need to be owned and performed by FA mechanics. Similarly mechanics in PSD
are opposed to moving work away from the group either externally to suppliers - full
ownership - or internally to FA because of job security concerns and a desire to retain control.
6.4 Future Considerations
One of the ways Kotter suggests to overcome complacency is by inundating employees
with information on the future opportunities, benefits and the current inability of the group to
pursue these opportunities. As previously discussed Everett PSD and final assembly are located
in separate buildings because the huge monuments used for EBU prevent the groups from
being co-located line side. Consequently the Everett Value Stream is unable to reap the same
feeder line gains as the 737 Value Stream did when they went line side with final assembly in
Renton. These benefits need to be communicated with employees in order to demonstrate
their value to the organization. Also the opportunity cost of occupying a building that could
otherwise be used for alternative purposes needs to be constantly communicated to PSD
employees. Lastly in order to overcome complacency, all PSD supervisors and managers need to
demonstrate excitement about the initiative - an attitude that was missing during the
internship. A lack of commitment from the entire leadership team will give subordinates the
sense that management is not 100% committed to the change initiative. In describing the
amount of urgency that is required, Kotter writes "a majority of employees, perhaps 75% of
management overall and virtually all of the top executives need to believe considerable change
is absolutely necessary."50
Boeing's size and the fact that several employees belong to a union, make Kotter's idea
of using a powerful guiding coalition to drive change initiatives more imperative. For years
propulsion systems has studied different ways to eliminate monuments during EBU however
none of the recommendations from these studies were ever adopted. Prototypes of new tools
were built and some new processes were piloted but eventually the group returned to the old
way of doing things. An observation from these previous improvement studies is that a
powerful guiding coalition did not exist to sustain the new process. In cases where teams
existed they were not cross-functional enough to satisfy all the major constituencies. A good
coalition needs to consist of experts from engineering, shop floor, manufacturing,
management, final assembly and any other group that may be affected by the change. These
employees must have credibility and a good reputation throughout their respective
organizations. Kotter notes team members with egos and snakes - people who create enough
mistrust to kill teamwork - must be avoided at all costs.
The final observation in section 6.3 discusses how the relationship between the vision
and the project is not well understood and agreed upon by all stakeholders i.e. PSD employees,
final assembly and union representatives. "One Line, One Way, One Day" which is the overall
vision, is aggressively promoted within propulsion systems only. Other stakeholders are
generally not well informed of this vision. Additionally, the business case analysis in Chapter 5
shows the financial justification for the options considered however PSD's leadership and other
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key employees should invest the time to communicate the importance of making this change to
all aforementioned stakeholders. This should be done using a variety of sources including large
and small group meetings, and one-on-one conservations. The message must be communicated
repeatedly to ensure it sinks in. As questions arise propulsion systems and final assembly
leadership teams must listen with an open mind to its employees' concerns and provide
solutions where possible. For instance if full ownership is chosen, PSD management must
address concerns about job elimination or reassignment and training for new roles. If work
flow changes is chosen, management must address the concerns final assembly mechanics have
with taking on additional work. Lastly the observed turf wars and structural silos which exist
between the shop floor in propulsion systems and final assembly must be broken down for the
vision to be effectively communicated.
Boeing creates some of the greatest and most complex products in the world. The level
of sophistication and expertise that goes into airplane manufacturing is tremendous hence
Boeing employees generally feel proud to be a part of the company. The size of the company,
the union and nature of the airplane manufacturing business - lots of regulations to ensure
safety - make Boeing largely bureaucratic resulting in processes following a close set of
standards. Also, structural silos are a common symptom in large unionized organizations but
ultimately it is one Boeing Company and decisions should be made with the best interest of the
company in mind.
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Appendix: 9-Step Plan
" Value stream mapping and analysis
" Balance the line
e Standardize work
* Put visuals in place
e Point of use staging
" Establish feeder/supply chain lines
e Break-through process re-design along main line
Convert line to a pulse line
* Convert to moving line (continuously flowing or one piece flow line)
